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In this paper, the economic impact of the 2006–2008 personal income tax
(PIT) reform in Lithuania is analyzed applying model-based simulations. We
ﬁnd that the undertaken PIT reform is unsustainable as it leads to perma-
nent government budget deﬁcits and ever increasing public debt. This result
holds even allowing for endogenous reduction in tax evasion. After introducing
permanent compensatory ﬁscal measures ensuring long-term sustainability of
the PIT reduction, we demonstrate that the lower PIT produces higher output
and lower prices in the long run. Higher domestic spending is supported by
higher employment and after-tax wages. Moreover, following a reduction in the
marginal production costs, producer prices fall enhancing economy’s interna-
tional competitiveness and boosting domestic exports. Pre-announcement of
the tax reform implies early macroeconomic reaction, and thus in most cases
smoother adjustment of the economy to the tax change.
Keywords: ﬁscal policy, taxation, tax evasion, dynamic general equilibrium
model.
JEL classiﬁcation: E62, H24, H25, H26.
Santrauka
Taikant kalibruotą Lietuvos ekonomikos dinamini ˛ stochastini ˛ bendrosios pusi-
ausvyros modeli ˛, darbe nagrin˙ ejamas 2006–2008 m. gyventoju ˛ pajamu ˛ mokesčio
(GPM) reformos poveikis šalies ekonomikai. Nustatoma, kad jis yra reikšmin-
gas ir teigiamas. Sumaž˙ ejusi GPM norma lemia didesni ˛ bendrąji ˛ vidaus pro-
duktą ir mažesni ˛ kainu ˛ lygi ˛ ilgu laikotarpiu. Šalies vartojimo išlaidu ˛ did˙ ejimą
skatina didesnis užimtumas ir darbo užmokesčio atskaičius mokesčius kilimas.
Kainu ˛ maž˙ ejimui turi i ˛takos ribiniu ˛ gamybos sąnaudu ˛ sumaž˙ ejimas, kuri ˛ lemia
sumaž˙ ejusios darbo sąnaudos. Visa tai prisideda ir prie Lietuvos eksporto
konkurencingumo did˙ ejimo, vadinasi, skatina šalies eksporto augimą. Paste-
bima, kad mokesčiu ˛ reformos išank-stinis paskelbimas lemia ankstyvesnę makro-
ekonominę reakciją i ˛ mokesčiu ˛ normos pokyčius ir šiek tiek sklandesni ˛ ekonomikos
prisitaikymą. Kita vertus, ilgu laikotarpiu GPM reforma gali lemti valdžios sek-
toriaus ﬁnansu ˛ nestabilumą, t. y. nuolatini ˛ valdžios sektoriaus biudžeto deﬁcitą
ir beribi ˛ valdžios sektoriaus skolos augimą. Tokio GPM reformos poveikio
valdžios ﬁnansams neatsveria net mokesčiu ˛ sl˙ epimo masto sumaž˙ ejimas. Valdžios
sektoriaus ﬁnansu ˛ ilgalaikiam tvarumui užtikrinti darbe si¯ uloma taikyti tokias
GPM reformos negatyvu ˛ poveiki ˛ valdžios sektoriaus ﬁnansams atsveriančias
ﬁskalin˙ es politikos priemones, kaip vyriausyb˙ es vartojimo ir (arba) namu ˛ ¯ ukiu ˛





















































































Albert Einstein: “The hardest thing to understand in the world is the income
tax”.
1 Introduction
On 7 June 2005, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania passed the Law Amending of
the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Personal Income Tax1 (PIT), which provided
for a gradual reduction, in the period 2006–2008, of the rate of PIT from 33 to 24
percent: to 27 percent (by 6 percentage points) from 1 July 2006 and to 24 per
cent (by 3 percentage points) from 1 January 2008. According to the Convergence
Programme of Lithuania of 2006, the reform had three major objectives: (1) to
achieve a better balance between labor and capital taxation, (2) to cut labor costs and
create favorable conditions for the growth of competitiveness vis-à-vis neighboring
countries, (3) to ease tax burden on labor and increase net wages.2 In order to keep
the present and future budgetary commitments, the temporary oﬀsetting measures
were adopted. On 1 January 2006, a temporary social tax on corporate income
was introduced at the level of 4 percent. Since 1 January 2007 the social tax rate
was reduced to 3 percent and was abolished by end of the year. Application of the
temporary social tax in fact implied an increase in the corporate income tax (CIT)
over 2006–2007. The graphical representation of the impact on statutory tax rates
of the reform can be found in Figure 6 in Appendix C.
Undoubtedly, the 2006–2008 PIT reform is one of the most important ﬁscal event
in the recent economic history in Lithuania which is expected to have substantial
eﬀects on the domestic economy. Nevertheless, virtually no sound analysis of po-
tential impact of the proposed measures on the Lithuanian economy can be found.3
There are no studies quantifying possible macroeconomic impact of the reform or
discussing its microeconomic implications (welfare analysis). Nor do we ﬁnd any dis-
cussion on the long-run sustainability of the proposed PIT cut which is questionable
noting that budget revenue compensatory measures are of temporary nature only.
Such discussion is highly desirable in the light of Lithuania’s aspiration to join the
European Monetary Union. The latter requires fulﬁllment of public deﬁcit and debt
criteria as a part of meeting the Maastricht criteria of convergence.
In this paper, we attempt to address some of the implication of the proposed
1Admittedly, from the conceptual point of view the tax reform deals with changes to labor tax
rather than personal income tax. Nevertheless, in this paper we use title employed in the oﬃcial
translation of the Law. The terms “labor tax” and “personal income tax” are used interchangeably
in the paper.
2See GLR (2006) for more details.
3Careful evaluation of the full range of potential macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy change
is a well-established international practice. For example, in the US model-based analysis of ﬁscal
policy decisions is extensively used in debating alternative ﬁscal policy choices and explaining its










































8 tax reform. In particular, using a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model for Lithuanian economy we investigate macroeconomic eﬀects of the
PIT reform as well as its welfare implications. The main features of the model are
optimal choice, forward-looking expectations, nominal and real rigidities. Sound
microeconomic foundations of the model allow conducting welfare analysis which
makes the model a very useful tool to address policy dilemmas policymakers face
when choosing the course of policy action. Special attention is paid to issue of pre-
announcement of the reform as well as implications of endogenous response of tax
evasion to tax policies in Lithuania.
We ﬁnd that the proposed PIT reform is unsustainable as it stands and addi-
tional compensatory measures beyond temporary increase in CIT are required. In its
present formulation, the PIT reform leads to permanent government budget deﬁcits
and ever increasing public debt. Assumption of endogenous reduction in tax evasion
enhances self-ﬁnancing of the tax cut to some extent, however, it does not fully solve
the problem of sustainability. The proposed compensatory mechanism is based on a
ﬁscal rule featuring endogenous adjustment of the level of government expenditure
to deviation of the actual public debt from its steady state level. Having ensured
sustainability of the PIT reduction, we show that the permanently lower PIT rate
results in higher output and lower prices in the long run. Higher domestic spending is
supported by higher employment and after-tax wages. Moreover, following a reduc-
tion in the marginal production costs, producer prices will fall enhancing economy’s
international competitiveness and boosting domestic exports. Temporary increase in
the CIT introduces visible macroeconomic volatility in the short run via signiﬁcant
fall in investment expenditure. Pre-announcement of the tax reform implies early
macroeconomic reaction and thus smoother adjustment of the economy to the tax
change afterwards.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the theo-
retical underpinnings of economic impact of changes in distortionary tax rates and
review some of the recent empirical ﬁndings on macroeconomic impact of PIT reform
in the literature. A brief introduction into the applied benchmark model structure
and its extensions are provided in Section 3. The scenarios of Lithuanian PIT reform
implemented in this paper and the model simulation results are discussed in Section
4. Lastly, in the concluding part (Section 5) we draw conclusions and discuss future
potentially fruitful research directions.
2 Transmission Channels of Taxes
There is large array of literature focusing on macroeconomic implications of tax
changes. The arsenal of empirical models used to quantify impact of tax reform





















































































conometric models. More recently the literature has been enriched by empirical stud-
ies applying DSGE models. Being set up on the ﬁrst principles with tight microe-
conomic foundations the new generation of models allows sound analysis of variety
of economic issues including tax policies. Consequently, by now DSGE models have
become the workhorse of modern macroeconomic research. The present analysis of
the ﬁscal reform in Lithuania is based on applying an open economy model featuring
the DSGE approach, therefore, in discussing channels of tax policy below we focus
on potential tax eﬀects within a DSGE framework.
In a typical DSGE model, income tax policies have both supply and demand side
eﬀects on economy (see Kumhof et al., 2005). On the supply side, changes in taxes
operate through their impact on agents’ incentives to work and to invest. For exam-
ple, an increase in PIT is expected to reduce labor supply via fall in after-tax wage
(labor supply channel).4 Higher CIT reduces after-tax return on investment and,
therefore, results in lower desired capital stock, investment, and long-term (or po-
tential) economic growth (cost of capital channel). From the welfare point of view, an
increase in PIT and CIT implies greater ineﬃciency in the labor and capital markets
(the deadweight loss will rise). On the demand side, response of private consump-
tion depends on whether changes in taxes aﬀect consumers’ permanent income. The
latter depends on persistence of changes in taxes and extent to which consumers are
impatient (high preference of current consumption over future consumption). More-
over, in the presence of large share of credit-constrained (rule-of-thumb) consumers
and shorter consumer spending planning horizon, transitory changes in tax will also
have signiﬁcant impact on consumption. In an open economy setup, lower PIT and
CIT are expected to enhance ﬁrms’ international competitiveness acting as real de-
preciation, thus, boosting exports (see also Botman and Kumar (2006), Botman et
al. (2006)).
The labor supply and cost of capital are traditional channels through which taxes
aﬀect economy. Other important transmission channels are tax evasion and expec-
tations. Tax evasion describes eﬀorts taken by economic agents to evade taxes by
illegal means: dishonest tax reporting (such as declaring less income, proﬁts or gains
than actually earned or overstating tax deductions). As evidenced by experience of
many countries tax evasion can be substantial. In practice, it can signiﬁcantly alter
eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy in achieving its objections. On the other hand, in case
of a tax cut endogenous reduction in tax evasion will enhance self-ﬁnancing of the
tax cut reducing its negative impact on government revenues.5 It should be noted,
4The opposite relationship between PIT rate and employment is well documented in Prescott
(2004). The impact of PIT cut on endogenous labor supply is estimated by Cardia et al. (2003).
They ﬁnd that a reduction in PIT rate by 10 percentage points would increase weekly hours worked
by 4.5 percent in Germany, 9.9 percent in Canada, 12.8-18.0 percent in the USA and 14.5 percent
in Japan.
5Agell et al. (2004) investigate the importance of tax avoidance in analysis of economic impact









































8 that, although there are some interesting extensions of DSGE models incorporating
tax evasion in the literature (see, for example, Busato et al. (2005)), tax evasion
behavior is not a common feature of DSGE models. Nevertheless, in estimating the
macroeconomic impact of the tax reform in Lithuania we analyze the role of en-
dogenous reaction in tax evasion by extending the benchmark model with (PIT) tax
evasion behavior. This extension allows us to explore extent to which the endogenous
reduction in the tax evasion could contribute to the PIT self-ﬁnancing – an argument
often cited in the policy debates over the tax system reform in Lithuania.
As it was exempliﬁed above in discussing the response of private consumption, the
expectations’ channel plays a crucial role in short to medium-term macroeconomic
reaction to the tax changes (permanent versus temporary). Another important exam-
ple of the role of expectations is related to pre-announcement of tax changes. Given
forward-looking behavior of agents, pre-announcement of credible policy change will
have immediate impact on economy. Eﬀectively, it implies that pre-announcement
of the reform reduces the macroeconomic impact of the reform on the date of actual
implementation of the policy change. For instance, Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) ex-
amine the eﬀects of expected and unexpected permanent labor and capital tax cut.
Using a DSGE model calibrated for the USA and EU-15 economies, they ﬁnd that an
announced labor tax cut leads to a drop in tax revenues in the short run. The results
are mainly due to decreased incentives for household to work and invest in capital.
Consequently, the tax revenues from labor and capital decline. The eﬀects of an an-
nounced capital tax cut are opposite. The announcement of lower capital taxes leads
to the investment boom that positively aﬀects the employment. Therefore, the tax
revenues from labor and capital increase. Since the pre-announcements have impor-
tant dynamic eﬀects, we will additionally analyze the impact of pre-announcement
of future tax changes on estimation of macroeconomic eﬀects of the tax reform in
Lithuania.
The analytical and presentational frameworks employed in this paper in many
respect mimic approach undertaken by Botman and Danninger (2007) in their anal-
ysis of the eﬀects of the recent ﬁscal reform in Germany.6 The authors use the IMF’s
Global Fiscal Model, which is a DSGE type model, to demonstrate long-term unsus-
tainability of the proposed tax changes in Germany and to investigate alternative tax
and expenditure measures that could be used to deal with the ﬁscal unsustainability
issue.
of the impact of tax changes on labor supply, tax revenues and welfare both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
6Diﬀerently from Botman and Danninger (2007), we consider inﬁnitely-lived agents, whereas






















































































To examine the impact of the proposed ﬁscal reform on the Lithuanian economy and
welfare, we utilize Karpavičius (2008) quarterly model calibrated to ﬁt the Lithuanian
macroeconomic data. The model belongs to the class of the New Keynesian DSGE
open economy models with sticky prices and nominal wages. Theoretical setup of
the benchmark model is largely based on Smets and Wouters (2003), Kollmann
(2002) and Dam and Linaa (2005). For the sake of current analysis, we modify
the benchmark model by introducing endogenous government debt and assuming
exogenous government expenditure, i.e. we assume that government consumption to
GDP ratio is constant. This enables us to capture the eﬀects of decrease in PIT rate
on government debt if any.
3.1 Benchmark Model
Our small open economy model features ﬁve sectors: households, intermediate-good
producers, ﬁnal-good producers, ﬁscal and monetary authorities. Inﬁnitely lived
households maximize the intertemporal utility from consumption and leisure sub-
ject to budget constraint and consumption habit. Each household is a monopolistic
supplier of a diﬀerentiated labor service implying explicit wage equation featuring
Calvo (1983) stickiness. Moreover, households own all domestic capital stock. They
rent capital to the domestic ﬁrms and decide how much to invest in the capital
stock given certain investment adjustment costs. Intermediate-good producers use
labor and capital to produce diﬀerentiated intermediate goods which are sold under
monopolistic competition to ﬁnal-good producers at home and abroad. Producers
of intermediate goods re-optimize prices infrequently á la Calvo, but can set dif-
ferent prices in the domestic and foreign markets. Final-good producers transform
both domestic and imported intermediate goods into homogeneous ﬁnal goods and
sell the latter in perfectly competitive markets. Fiscal authority collects taxes, pur-
chases public goods and makes transfers to households. The government budget’s
balance is achieved by endogenous variation in public consumption which ensures
zero public debt in the steady state. The monetary policy is described by a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime. The interest rate at which households and government can
borrow funds abroad depends on foreign interest rate and a risk premium which is an
increasing function of net foreign debt. A more formal description of the structure
and calibration of the model is provided in Appendix A.
Analysis of welfare implications of the tax reform is based on the non-stochastic
utility of households. In particular, we consider two measures of welfare both ex-
pressed in terms steady state level of consumption: the measurement of instantaneous
welfare gains and the lifetime consumption equivalent measure of welfare. Details










































3.2 Model Extension: Tax Evasion
In order to analyze the impact of the PIT cut in Lithuania in the presence of tax
evasion, we modify the benchmark model by including the disutility of tax evasion
























where Ct denotes private consumption; Gt denotes public consumption; lt is labor
supply; σC is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consump-
tion (the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion); σL is inverse of the elasticity of labor
supply; nt(j) stands for the degree of the individual tax evasion, i.e., the part of
labor income that is not reported to the authority; h is the habit formation parame-
ter; ζb
t and ζL
t denote correspondingly a shock to the discount rate and labor supply
shock both speciﬁed as stationary autoregressive processes. From the utility func-
tion speciﬁcation follows that in maximising the utility a representative household
takes the level of public goods as given. Our speciﬁcation implies non-substitution
between private and public consumption. The latter assumption reﬂects observa-
tion that substantial part of government consumption (for example, military, police
expenditures) cannot be substituted by private consumption.
In the presence of tax evasion, a representative household earns labor income
wt(j)lt(j) and pays labor income tax (1 − nt(j))τl
twt(j)lt(j) instead of τl
twt(j)lt(j).
As a result, the households face the trade-oﬀ between fraudulent tax report and
lower net incomes. Compared to the benchmark speciﬁcation, the household’s budget
constraint is modiﬁed accordingly:
(1 + τc




= (1 − τk




+ wt(j)lt(j) − (1 − nt(j))τl





where It stands for investment; Kt denotes the stock of capital at the end of period
t; Bt denotes the stock of nominal foreign debt at the end of period t; πt is the
redistributed nominal corporate proﬁts; St is state subsidies; Ss
t is payments from
state-contingent securities; wt denotes real (gross) wage; τc
t , τk
t , τl
t are the eﬀective





















































































nominal exchange rate; ω denotes the labor-augmenting technological (deterministic)
change; it denotes the nominal interest rate paid on foreign borrowing.
Solving the utility maximization problem results in the following equation for the









Equation (1) shows that the optimal level of tax evasion is the one at which
marginal disutility from misreporting extra income is equal to marginal disutility
from foregone consumption when extra income are correctly reported to the tax
authorities. It follows from the optimality condition, that the higher (lower) labor
income tax causes the higher (lower) level of tax evasion. This implies that the change
of the statutory labor income tax rate will result in less than proportional change
of the eﬀective labor income tax rate. Therefore, in the presence of tax evasion,
variation in the statutory income tax will have lesser impact on the government’s
revenues than in a model without tax evasion behavior.
The calibration of the model parameters implies that the level of tax evasion in
steady state, ¯ n, is equal to 0.21, i.e., in equilibrium 21 percent of labor income is not
reported to the tax authorities in Lithuania.7
4 Results
In this section, we present our main ﬁndings.8 First of all, we demonstrate that the
proposed reform as it stands in the Convergence Programme of Lithuania of 2006 is
unsustainable. Permanent PIT cut combined with temporary increase in CIT results
in permanent government deﬁcits and ever increasing public debt. This result holds
even allowing for endogenous response in tax evasion which falls following the PIT
cut. To achieve sustainability of the PIT cut, we introduce additional compensatory
ﬁscal measures which include adjustment in the government consumption. Other
compensatory ﬁscal measures, such as cut in transfers to households and increase
in other taxes, are investigated as well. Macroeconomic and welfare impact of the
ﬁscal reform is evaluated using the benchmark model as well as an extended version
featuring tax evasion. A bulk of our analysis is based on model simulation results
assuming that the tax changes are implemented unexpectedly. However, we show
that the short-run impact of the tax reform may depend crucially on whether the
reform is credibly pre-announced or implemented unexpectedly.
7The number is consistent with the estimates of State Tax Inspectorate of the Lithuanian Re-
public (15-20 percent (Delﬁ, 2006)) and not much diﬀerent from the one in the USA (18 percent,
according to Slemrod (2007)).










































8 4.1 Outcome of the Reform
The model-based simulations of the tax reform, outlined in the Convergence Pro-
gramme, imply that the reform is unsustainable. In particular, the reform results in
permanent public sector deﬁcit and unsustainable government debt development (see
Figure 1). The combined macroeconomic eﬀect of permanent PIT cut and temporary
increase in CIT is provided in Figure 2.








1Q2006 1Q2012 1Q2018 1Q2024 1Q2030 1Q2036 1Q2042 1Q2048 1Q2054
% of GDP
Benchmark model
Model with tax evasion
The PIT reduction leads to lower gross wages boosting employment demand,
lowering marginal production costs and, as a result, domestic prices. Improvement
in international competitiveness of the domestically produced intermediate goods
brings permanent increase in export volumes. Lower export prices, however, oﬀset
higher export volumes, so that the nominal export is unaﬀected in the long run.
There is a positive impact on the current account balance in the short run, though,
in the long run it is left unaﬀected. The temporary increase in CIT leads to the
lower after-tax return on capital, thus households have less incentives to invest,
and the condition of optimal intertemporal consumption implies higher consumption
expenditure in the short run.
Initial drop in investment negatively aﬀects GDP, but after 2009 the impact on
GDP is positive, mainly due to the boosted employment. As regards the impact of
the tax reform on the public ﬁnances, we ﬁnd that the temporary increase in CIT is
not capable of oﬀsetting permanent reductions in government tax income.
In the model featuring tax evasion the reform leads to reduction in the level of tax
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mitigation of the macroeconomic impact of the tax changes (see Figure 2). However,
endogenous response of tax evasion is not enough to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio,
leaving issue of ﬁscal sustainability unresolved.
Further we investigate how sustainability of the permanent PIT cut can be
achieved by assuming endogenous response in the government expenditures.
4.2 Sustainability of the Reform
We showed above that without additional compensatory ﬁscal measures the proposed
reform is not sustainable, i.e., government debt explodes in the long run. In order to
ensure sustainability of the permanent reduction in the PIT we allow government to
adjust its expenses according to some rule which is based on stabilization of the size
of government debt. The choice of government expenditure as the key adjustment
instrument is supported by observation that in the past most ﬁscal consolidations in
Lithuania relied on changes in government consumption rather than in taxes. Let
the ﬁscal rule be as follows:











where gt denotes the government consumption to GDP ratio at date t; B
g
t is the
government debt; Ψt is the GDP; the entries with a “bar” are the steady-state values
of the corresponding variables.
We log-linearize the following equation around the balanced growth path:





t denotes the log-deviation of government debt to GDP ratio.
The parameter φg in Equation 3 is set to 0.2. The latter implies that the gov-
ernment is able to reduce the debt gap by approximately 50 percent during 1 year.
Although the value of the adjustment parameter φg may seems arbitrary, our main
ﬁndings of the analysis are robust with respect to alternative assumptions about the
speed of adjustment in government expenditure.9
Response of the key macroeconomic and welfare indicators to implementation of
the tax reform under endogenous reaction in the government expenditure is reported
in Figure 3 and Table 2 in Appendix C. Allowing for the rule-based adjustment of
government expenditure helps to stabilize government debt to GDP ratio (Figure
3h). In particular, in case of the benchmark model (i.e., without tax evasion) per-
manent cut in the PIT leads to a permanent increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio by 7
9For example, considering smaller value of the parameter of, say, 0.1 implies slower adjustment of
government expenditure and, therefore, two times higher level of government debt in the long run.
Overall economic activity and impact on welfare measures, however, are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
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8 percentage points. To sustain permanent cut in PIT the government is required to
cut its expenditure by 8 percent in the long run.
Endogenous adjustment in the government consumption reduces the positive im-
pact of the tax reform on the rest of the economy over the long run and signiﬁcantly
aﬀects its adjustment in the short run. As households derive utility from provision
of public goods, a reduction in government expenditure also implies direct welfare
losses for households. The latter to certain extent is compensated with higher private
consumption which is mainly ﬁnanced by supplying more labor service. Overall, our
welfare measure indicates the positive impact of the reform only up to 2008. In the
long run, the welfare, in terms of steady state consumption, is 0.3 percent lower than
in the absence of the reform. This naturally leads to a question on whether reduction
in the government expenditure is an optimal compensatory measure. Later in Sec-
tion 4.5, we investigate alternative compensatory mechanisms comprising increase in
other tax rates and reduction in transfers to households.
4.3 The Role of Tax Evasion
In the presence of tax evasion behavior, the proposed rule-based adjustment of gov-
ernment expenditure allows to stabilize government debt to GDP ratio incurring
less macroeconomic volatility and less hazard to welfare (see Figure 3 and Table 2
in Appendix C). More speciﬁcally, permanent cut in the PIT leads to a permanent
increase in the debt to GDP ratio by only 5 percentage points. Also, stabilization
of the public ﬁnances requires less cut in government expenditure, namely, 6 percent
instead of 8 percent obtained in the benchmark model. These diﬀerences stem from
the fact that endogenous reduction in the tax evasion (in this particular case the
share of under-reported labor income drops by 6 percentage points) contributes to
self-ﬁnancing of the tax cut, thus, reducing the need to adjust public expenditures.
Tax evasion also carries important implications for eﬀects of the reform on wel-
fare. In this case, the impact of the reform on welfare measures is positive both in
the short run and long run. On the one hand, compared to the benchmark case,
there is less reduction in provision of public goods (welfare enhancing argument)
and less increase in the labor supply. The latter directly increases welfare while
reducing it indirectly via lower private consumption induced by lower labor income
of households. On the other hand, households’ welfare is substantially boosted by
shrinking shadow economy, i.e., there is less need in engaging in illegal activities
which is an important source of disutility for our households. More precisely, in
the benchmark case the reform reduces the instantaneous welfare of households by
0.3 percent of households’ consumption in the steady state, whereas in case of tax
evasion the reform induces an increase in welfare by 0.8 percent of consumption in
the steady state. The lifetime consumption equivalent measure in the benchmark






















































































4.4 The Role of Pre-Announcement
In this subsection, we assess the role of pre-announcement in the economic impact
of the ﬁscal reform. In doing so we assume that the announcement of the tax reform
package in the 2nd quarter of 2005 is credibly received by the households and ﬁrms.
The timing of actual changes in tax rates are as before (see graphical representation
in Figure 6 in Appendix C). To maintain focus on the issue of the pre-announcement
in what follows we ignore potential eﬀects from tax evasion, i.e., it is treated ex-
ogenously. The impact of the pre-announced reform along with the impact of an
unexpected reform is displayed in Figure 4.
Compared to the unexpected reform scenario, the pre-announcement of the tax
reform has similar implications for the long-run impact of the tax changes. The main
diﬀerences between the two scenarios are in the short run. Visually, in case of the pre-
announced reform the responses of the main macroeconomic variables at the reform
implementation dates are smoother than in case of the unexpected reform. The
pre-announcement of the tax changes leads to an earlier macroeconomic adjustment.
Households observe that their intertemporal after-tax income from labor activities
is aﬀected positively, thus, they optimally decide to open their purses just after the
announcement. As macroeconomic adjustment starts before actual tax rate changes
take place, the size of the eﬀect of the reform on impact is lower than in case of the
unexpected reform.
The front-loading behavior in private consumption results in substantial increase
in economic activity in 2005–2007 with visible stabilization in 2008–2010. Rising
economic activity positively aﬀect the labor market and prices in the short run. In
particular, employment raises by 0.4 percent already by 2007. The pre-announcement
of the tax cut also leads to higher inﬂationary pressure in the early periods.
As regards the external sector, current account reaction in the short run depends
crucially on whether the tax reform is pre-announced or implemented unexpectedly.
In the former case, the households’ decision to advance their consumption immedi-
ately boosts the import of intermediate goods resulting in deterioration of the current
account. However, as actual cut in PIT takes place, international competitiveness
gains are released enhancing domestic exports. Higher exports oﬀset the initial rise
in imports and bring the current account closer to the balance.
With respect to welfare implications, compared to the unexpected reform sce-
nario, the pre-announcement of the reform produces higher welfare level in earlier
periods (in 2005 the instantaneous welfare gains are approximately 0.8 percent of
the steady state level of consumption) and lower welfare levels in the subsequent
periods. Surprisingly, in the long run, the pre-announced reform leads to slightly

































































































Unexpected reform 0 0 0 0 0.106619 0.134819 0.039892 0.013436
Pre-announced reform 0 -0.1943 -0.2855 -0.3249 -0.3292 -0.3808 -0.3270 -0.2864
Model with tax evasion
Unexpected reform 0 0 0 0 0.106168 0.134065 0.070494 0.053618
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equivalent measure, is smaller by 1.1 percent.10
4.5 Choice of Compensatory Measure
Previously we saw that the use of the government consumption as the main stabi-
lization tool might result in substantial welfare losses for the households. In this
subsection, we assess long-run macroeconomic and welfare implications of applica-
tion of alternative compensatory mechanisms. In the following set of simulations,
the PIT cut is implemented as in the Convergence Program, but instead of tempo-
rary CIT increase we apply a set of permanent compensatory measures, one at a
time: government expenditure, transfers, CIT, consumption tax (value added tax
– VAT).11 We assume that tax evasion is exogenous (previously we saw that this
feature decreases the scale of impulse responses and positively aﬀects welfare) and
that the reform is implemented unexpectedly. The latter assumption is used since
here we are only interested in the long-run eﬀects.12
In Figure 5, we present the macroeconomic and welfare impact of the permanent
cut in the PIT when diﬀerent compensatory measures are employed (“G” stands for
lower government expenditure, “Transfers” means that whole PIT cut is compen-
sated by an increase in lump-sum taxes or lower transfers to households). Whenever
the PIT cut is not compensated by lower government expenditure, we assume that
government expenditure to GDP ratio is constant.
Overall, we ﬁnd that sustainability of the permanent PIT cut requires the gov-
ernment to increase CIT and VAT rates permanently by respectively 3.6 and 2.8
percentage points. Similarly, transfers and government expenditure should be de-
creased by respectively 1.5 and 1.3 percent of GDP.
Compensating the PIT cut with adjustment in transfers, which is a non-distortionary
ﬁscal measure, allows to reduce distortions in the economy induced by use of incentive-
altering taxation system. In our model, adjustment in transfers leads to the largest
positive impact on GDP, but since lower transfers ceteris paribus imply lower con-
sumption gains (via negative impact on disposable income) and longer working hours,
the households’ welfare loss is also the highest among all the compensatory measures
considered in the analysis.
On the other hand, while using of CIT as a compensatory measure is preferable
10Although, compared to the unexpected reform, the pre-announcement of the reform does not
seem to be beneﬁcial for the economy in the long run, the pre-announced ﬁscal reform might be still
an attractive option for politicians thinking in terms of impact on the electorate. Indeed, in the
short run, the pre-announcement creates surge in economic activity and results in higher income
from taxes, thus creating illusion of sustainability of the reform without any need for future ﬁscal
restraint.
11We do not present the results of simulations when temporary increase in CIT is used since the
temporary measure does not aﬀect the values of the variables in the long run.
12Figure 4 illustrates that the impulse responses of the unexpected and pre-announced reforms
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in terms of the welfare implications, it produces the largest reduction in GDP. The
increase in CIT results in lower optimal capital stock and, therefore, lower output.
Similar to VAT and government expenditure, using CIT as a compensatory measure
determines relatively low instantaneous welfare loss.
Interestingly, the two compensatory measures, VAT and government expenditure,
lead to the identical impact on GDP and labor in the long run. Their impact on
consumption, though, represents two polar outcomes. Lower government expenditure
results in the largest increase in private consumption. However, when VAT rate
(eﬀective tax on consumption) is increased, consumption becomes relatively more
expensive resulting in lower demand for consumption goods.
When it comes to choosing one single compensatory measure, it appears that
reduction in government expenditure is indeed the most attractive option. It is
equivalent to CIT and VAT in terms of welfare implications, and compared to all
compensatory measures allows to achieve the highest level of consumption with min-
imum labor eﬀorts.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, macroeconomic and welfare implications of the recent tax reform in
Lithuania are investigated using a calibrated DSGE model of the Lithuanian econ-
omy. Explicit analysis of the role of pre-announcement of the reform and endogenous
response in tax evasion is undertaken. Overall, we have shown that the reform is not
sustainable is the long run, unless some permanent compensatory measures are em-
ployed. These might include permanent reduction in government expenditure, trans-
fers to households, increase in other taxes. For given speciﬁcation of the benchmark
model we demonstrate that, while being politically the most feasible compensatory
measure, reduction in government expenditure can be also regarded as optimal one.
Using the government expenditure as the main instrument of ﬁscal consolida-
tion, we ﬁnd that the permanent PIT cut has positive long-run impact on GDP,
consumption and employment. Furthermore, lower PIT rate reduces the labor tax
wedge producing a rise in after-tax wage rate while lowering gross wage bill faced
by ﬁrms. With lower marginal production costs domestic ﬁrms can reduce output
prices and exploit price competitiveness gains in the foreign markets. In this regard,
we can conclude that under appropriate choice of ﬁscal compensatory measures two
objectives of the reform out of three outlined in the introduction are likely to be
fulﬁlled, whereas we cannot say much on the objective “to achieve better balance
between labor and capital taxation” due to its ambiguous formulation.
While sustainability of the permanent PIT cut requires permanent reduction
in government expenditure (or increase in other taxes), the need for compensatory









































8 evasion. The shrinkage of the labor income under-reporting can be substantial and
enhance self-ﬁnancing of the tax cuts.
Pre-announcement of the reform does not have signiﬁcant eﬀect regarding long-
run impact on the economy; however, it carries signiﬁcant implication for the short-
run adjustment dynamics. In particular, compared to the unexpected reform, in
case of pre-announced reform macroeconomic adjustment is characterized by greater
smoothness on the dates when actual tax changes take place. On the one hand,
based on our welfare measure, we do not ﬁnd that pre-announcement of the reform
is beneﬁcial for the economy compared to the unexpected reform. On the other
hand, the pre-announced credible ﬁscal policy helps to reduce the macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations, and in this regard can be of some beneﬁt.
Finally, the paper will be complete without mentioning some caveats of our anal-
ysis. In this regard, as the main shortcoming of the modeling approach adopted in
this paper, we consider the non-existence of non-Ricardian consumers. The latter
implies rather smooth dynamic responses. Adding, for example, rule-of-thumb con-
sumers would allow to generate more pronounced macroeconomic responses to the
ﬁscal reform. Furthermore, admittedly our measure of welfare deserves further work.
In particular, as a result of linearization of the model certainty equivalence holds leav-
ing no room for welfare eﬀects stemming from risk aversion behavior. In practice, it
prevents us from proper investigation of welfare implications of pre-announced ver-
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A Summary of The Model
A.1 Theoretical Setup
In what follows, we brieﬂy describe the model structure, noting that a more detailed
description (in Lithuanian) can be found in Karpavičius (2008).
Intermediate-good market





where Kt−1 is the capital stock at the end of period t−1; Lt is the employed labor;
ϕ is the capital share; ω denotes the labor-augmenting technological (deterministic)
change; θt denotes a ﬁrst-order autoregressive shock to total factor productivity.
Optimal choices of capital and labor are derived by minimizing the cost of pro-
duction subject to technological constraint characterised by the production function
and taking the price of factors of production as given. The latter, in combination
with an assumption of common technology of production, implies that the optimal
capital-labor ratio as well as marginal cost of production, MCt, are identical across













t ϕ−ϕ(1 − ϕ)−1+ϕ, (6)
where Rt and wt are respectively real rental rate of capital and real wage.
Intermediate-good producers set price on their output á la Calvo (1983). Each
period only (1−λp) share of producers can set their prices optimally. Optimal prices
on intermediate goods sold domestically and abroad are derived by maximizing the
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where κt is a discount factor; pd
t and px
t denote price of intermediate domestic goods
sold respectively at home and abroad by individual domestic producers; Pd
t and
Px
t are aggregate prices of domestic intermediate goods sold respectively at home
and abroad; Pt is price of ﬁnal goods sold at home; qd
t and qx
t denote respectively
domestic and foreign demand for output of a domestic intermediate-good producer;
Qd
t and Qx
t denote aggregate demand for domestic intermediate goods by respectively
domestic and foreign ﬁnal-good producers; et is nominal exchange rate; νt is a serially
uncorrelated shock to price mark-up.
Intermediate-good producers, who do not receive permission to re-optimize their
price, keep the same price as in the previous period. The economy-wide price of











where i = (d,x), ˜ Pi
t is the aggregate optimal price of domestically produced inter-
mediate goods.
Final-good market
Final goods are produced by combining domestic (Qd
t) and imported (Qm
t ) intermedi-
ate goods as inputs. More speciﬁcally, each ﬁnal-good producer faces the production













where α denotes home bias.13
Optimal demand for domestic and foreign intermediate goods are obtained by



























13We drop index of individual ﬁnal-good producer for simplicity of exposition. Due to assumption































































































A representative household j maximizes utility from leisure and consumption of both


























where Ct denotes private ﬁnal consumption goods; Gt denotes public ﬁnal consump-
tion goods14; lt is labor supply; σC is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption; σL is inverse of the elasticity of labor supply; β de-
notes the subjective discount factor; h denotes the habit formation parameter; ζb
t
and ζL
t are correspondingly a shock to the discount rate and labor supply shock both
speciﬁed as stationary autoregressive processes.
The intratemporal budget constraint faced by each household is as follows:
(1 + τc
t )Ct(j) + It(j) + et
Bt−1(j)
Pt
(1 + it−1)exp(−ω) =
= (1 − τk





+ (1 − τl





where It stands for investment; Bt denotes the stock of nominal (private) foreign debt
at the end of period t; πt is the redistributed nominal proﬁt of intermediate-good
producers; St is state subsidies (transfers to each household); Ss




t are the eﬀective tax rates levied on respectively
consumption, capital and labor income; it denotes the nominal interest rate paid on
foreign borrowing.
As follows from the speciﬁcation of the budget constraint above, households’
borrowing/lending is limited to selling/buying domestic assets to/from foreigners.
This assumption reﬂects overwhelming role of borrowing of foreign funds by the
domestic private sector behind stunning surge of Lithuania’s foreign debt observed
over the last decade.
14It is noteworthy, that while consumption of either private or public goods aﬀects household’s











































The capital accumulation evolves subject to investment adjustment cost ΓI(•):15










where δ is the capital depreciation rate; I
t is an autoregressive shock to the invest-
ment adjustment cost function.
Since households are the monopolistic suppliers of diﬀerentiated labor services,
they are able to set their wages. However, due to presence of Calvo (1983) type
of staggered wage contracts only (1 − λw) of all households receive permission to
optimally reset their nominal wage contract in a given period t. When allowed to set
the nominal wage optimally, a household will choose it as a mark-up of the real after-
tax wage over household’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure. The nominal wage rate of those households, who do not receive permission to
re-optimize their wage, remains unchanged. Thus, the economy-wide nominal wage,





γt + (1 − λw)( ˜ Wt)
− 1
γt , (12)
where ˜ Wt is the aggregate optimal nominal wage; (1−λw) is the probability of having
permission to reset the wage contract in a given period t; γt is a serially uncorrelated
shock to mark-up of the real after-tax wage.
Fiscal authority
In the benchmark case, the government is running balanced budget. The latter
is achieved via adjustment of real public consumption, Gt. For ﬁxed (exogenous)
level of government consumption, any ﬁscal surplus (deﬁcit) will result in decreasing




t Ct + τk

















Similar to households, we assume, that the government’s borrowing relies solely
on foreign funds. The latter assumption is supported by evidence of dominant role
of foreign borrowing when looking at decomposition of Lithuania’s public debt in
terms of sources of ﬁnancing.
The eﬀective tax rates are assumed to be exogenous processes following an au-
toregressive speciﬁcation.
15In Karpavičius (2008) the capital accumulation evolves subject to capital adjustment cost.























































































In line with the currency board arrangement in Lithuania, monetary policy in the
model features the ﬁxed exchange rate regime:
et = ¯ e(1 + ξt), (14)
where ¯ e is the ﬁxed exchange rate; ξt denotes a serially uncorrelated monetary policy
shock.
The interest rate at which households and government can borrow funds abroad
depends on foreign interest rate, i∗
t, and a risk premium which is an increasing
function of net foreign debt of the whole economy:







¯ Px ¯ Qx

exp(υt), (15)
where Θ measures degree of capital mobility; ¯ Px ¯ Qx is the steady-state value of
nominal exports; υt is a serially uncorrelated shock to the uncovered interest parity
condition.
Foreign variables and home exports
Given small size of the Lithuanian economy relative to its export markets, foreign
variables are modeled exogenously. In particular, foreign income (foreign GDP),
prices and interest rate are assumed to follow an autoregressive process around their
steady state path.













t and Y ∗
t are respectively foreign price and income, η denotes price elasticity
of home exports.
Market clearing
Market clearing implies that ﬁnal good, Zt, is either consumed as the private or
public good, or invested.
Zt = Ct + It + Gt (17)
Furthermore, the cash inﬂows of the whole economy are equal to outﬂows, i.e.,














































t = (Bt−1 + B
g






Finally, we deﬁne the gross domestic product, Ψt, as follows:
































































































Table 1 displays the calibration of the main parameters. The model is calibrated to
match quarterly Lithuanian data, however standard parameter values oﬀered by the
literature are used as well.
Table 1: Calibration of the main parameters of the model.
Parameter Value Source
Preferences
Habit formation h 0.550 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Elast. of substitution: consumption σC 1.000 Christiano et al. (2005)
Elast. of substitution: labor supply σL 1.000 Christiano et al. (2005)
Discount factor β 0.990 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Wage and Price setting
Wage mark-up: steady state ¯ γ 0.050 Christiano et al. (2005)
Price mark-up: steady state ¯ ν 0.160 Martins et al. (1996)
Calvo parameter for wages λw 0.750 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Calvo parameter for prices λp 0.750 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Final-good production
Home bias α 0.500 Industrial statistics
Price elasticity of exports η 1.000 Dam and Linaa (2005)
Intermediate-good production
Capital share ϕ 0.297 National accounts
Deterministic productivity growth ω 0.014 Jakaitien˙ e (2006)
Depreciation rate δ 0.025 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Fiscal and monetary policy
Transfers to GDP (in %): steady state ¯ s 0.730 National accounts
Consumption tax rate: steady state ¯ τ
c 0.162 National accounts
Capital income tax rate: steady state ¯ τ
k 0.051 National accounts
Labor income tax rate: steady state ¯ τ
l 0.091 National accounts
Capital mobility Θ 0.002 Kollmann (2002)
Autoregressive coeﬃcients
Total factor productivity shock ρ
θ 0.850 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Shock to the discount rate ρ
b 0.850 Dam and Linaa (2005)
Labor supply shock ρ
L 0.850 Dam and Linaa (2005)
Investment-speciﬁc shock ρ
I
0.850 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Consumption tax rate ρ
τc
0.300 Karpavičius (2008)
Capital income tax rate ρ
τk
0.280 Karpavičius (2008)









Foreign interest rate ρ
i∗
0.880 Karpavičius (2008)










































B Derivation of Welfare Measure
We base our welfare analysis upon the computation of the non-stochastic instanta-
























Note that the last term (in brackets) is optional and used in case of tax evasion.
The impact of tax evasion on household’s utility is similar to the one of working
time. Therefore, the disutility of tax evasion has the same structure as the disutility
from labor in the utility function.
We log-linearize the utility function around consumption in steady state:
Ut ≈ ¯ U + ¯ Cˆ Ut.
Therefore, the measure of welfare, ˆ Ut, shows the changes of the utility of house-
hold in terms of consumption:
ˆ Ut =

(1 − h) ¯ C
−σC ˆ Ct − h

(1 − h) ¯ C





(1 − h) ¯ G






(1 − h) ¯ G











Notice that ˆ nt shows not the deviations in percent, but the percentage points
deviations from ¯ n.
ˆ Ut can be considered as the measurement of instantaneous welfare gains in terms
of consumption. In addition, the respective literature (e.g., Prescott, 2004) suggests
to use the lifetime consumption equivalent measure. It shows the percentage of
consumption today and in all future periods must be increased in order that the
households would be indiﬀerent to the proposed policy change.
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